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ABSTRACT With financialization now acknowledged as one of the most potent threats to income
equality, can finance-driven inequality be explained by a singular causal argument? Taking the case
of top incomes across the OECD, this paper addresses the standard causal narrative of finance-
driven inequality, where rising top income inequality is explained as a function of deregulation,
financial sector growth, and a parallel weakening of the role of trade unions and the government.
Applying fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to a time-series dataset (1975–2005),
it assesses the ways in which configurations of institutions combined in different ways prior to the
recent financial crisis, to create policy contexts conducive to top income growth. It does this by
adopting a time-series approach to QCA, involving calibration and analysis of data at three
successive historical waves. Results suggest that top incomes in the era of finance-driven capitalism
were subject to a diversity of causal paths which generated similar outcomes in different contexts, in
a manner which departs substantially from the standard narrative. In doing so, it elaborates on the
application of time-series approaches to case-based analysis, and uses its results to discuss the ways
in which institutions may combine in different ways to generate similar, or divergent outcomes.
Keywords: time-series qualitative comparative analysis; financialization; income inequality; top
incomes; comparative; sociology
1. Introduction: Institutional Determinants of Inequality: How Does Social Policy
Make you Richer?
We live in a world of unprecedented inequality. In a pattern repeated across many
capitalist democracies, the wealthiest US earners have quadrupled their incomes since
1979, with one-third of those now drawn from executive, managerial, and supervisory
occupations (Kenworthy 2017). Since the financial crisis, the fortunes of top earners are
returning to steady growth, whilst the public fallout from the economic crash is still
generating debate about how to prevent its proximate causes from wreaking havoc once
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again. A large body of literature now points toward the process of “financialization” both
as a precondition for the financial crisis, and as a stressor of income equality, with specific
benefits for top earners. The concept points to the qualitatively different opportunities for
income generation linked to the financial sector which have emerged in recent decades,
and the institutional changes which render it distinct from previous phases of capitalism
(Foster and Holleman 2010). Financialization is thus characterized by rising shares of total
economy Gross Value Added (GVA) accruing to the financial sector, deregulation of
global capital flows, greater accrual of profit through financial, rather than commodity
channels, and widespread access to cheap credit (van der Zwan 2014).
Rather than offering universal economic benefits through greater economy-wide pro-
ductivity, its gains have been narrowly concentrated, contributing to a decline in economic
growth, and an increase in inequality (Flaherty 2015; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2015). As
such, the process of financialization is often viewed as mediated strongly by policy. This
has variously occurred through fiscal, economic, social, and regulatory policy decisions
enacted either by governments or trans-national compacts and treaties, coupled with
“supply-focused” growth policies which favour the deregulation of capital and labour,
and growth of financial sectors. The standard narrative of inequality thus views finance-
driven top income growth as a cumulative result of shifting power resources from labour
to capital, producing substantial top compensation opportunities within financialized
firms. This process was in turn facilitated by regulatory architectures which privilege
the free movement of capital central to the financialization process, and the removal of
states from labour market regulation and public investment (Kus 2012; Volscho and Kelly
2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Stockhammer 2013; Flaherty 2015).
This article investigates further this “classic” narrative of inequality, by examining the
institutional diversity which underpinned top income inequality in a sample of Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. It traces the presence and
applicability of this classic narrative at a number of points in time from the 1970s to just before
the financial crisis. A strong case exists for a specific focus on “the 1 per cent” as a distinct
aspect of inequality, and a key outcome of the financialization process. The class homogeneity
of the 1 per cent is suggested by their access to rental income, dividends, and investment yields
‒ resources generally denied to the working population at large (Epstein and Power 2003;
Alvaredo et al. 2013; Kus 2016). National context plays a central role in facilitating top income
accumulation. As the composition of wealth has changed over time (such as housing displa-
cing land as a basis of wealth from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries), so too did pre-crisis
financial deregulation offer new opportunities for resource-endowed individuals to leverage
greater personal returns (Piketty 2014; van der Zwan 2014).
Kim et al. (2015) have shown how inter-earner networking incentivized competition
amongst Chief Executive Officer (CEOs), complementing Piketty’s (2014) conclusion that
reductions in top marginal tax rates played a key role in spurring a “take off” in top
compensation since the 1970s. The mechanisms of this process are poorly understood,
however. Regression-based methods predominate in the studies of the financialization‒
inequality connection (Kus 2012; Stockhammer 2013; Flaherty 2015), and the estimation
of complex interactions is difficult in a panel context – more of which below. As such, less
attention has been given to the underlying diversity of case types which make up the
panels on which these studies are based. This is not an inherent limitation of a panel
approach – as the estimation of partial effects is essential to strategizing for change.
Instead, it reflects the general neglect of causal complexity in the political economy
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literature – partly methodological, and partly conceptual, insofar as analysis often leans on
sets of variables embedded in formal theories, and sourced with wide consensus.
This study addresses this omission by subjecting a set of pooled time-series cross-section
data to repeated cross-sectional fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analyses (fsQCA). Its
aims are twofold: (1) to explore the prevalence and applicability of the “classic causal
combination” of rising top income inequality by exploring potential diversity in the mix of
conditions leading to top incomes; and (2) to further embed case-based methods in the
regression-based political economy literature, by suggesting they become complementary
strategies in the task of causal mapping. It begins by detailing the institutional conditions on
which variation in experiences of financialization may occur, both across countries, and
within countries over time. Second, it outlines the relative merits of case-based and panel
methods for addressing longitudinal variation, followed by an application of fsQCA to a
panel of capitalist democracies from 1975 to 2005.
2. The Diverse Institutional Channelling of Financialization
The direction of inequality in the pre-crisis years is well understood. In a pattern
repeated for other measures of inequality such as labour’s share of GDP and the Gini
personal income distribution, top incomes enjoyed remarkable growth across many
countries during the late 1990s/early 2000s (see Figure 1). This pattern has been
Figure 1. Top income shares across the OECD, 1975–2005
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interpreted by Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA) analysts as driven by stark
changes in the character of economic regulation in the post-war era (Kotz 2003;
McDonough et al. 2010; Jessop 2013). In this perspective, the 1980s are viewed as
a crucial policy juncture, with a loosening of regulatory constraints on capital,
supplanting of real wages with cheap credit, privatization of public services, and a
withdrawal of the state from labour market regulation (Tabb 2010). Accordingly, top
incomes were free to flourish under this regime, whilst wider incomes stagnated.
How might experiences of financialization have varied across countries, and did the
factors of financialization necessarily result in greater top income inequality? As to
why countries experience greater or lesser degrees of inequality, several standard
narratives are often invoked. Theories which allocate countries to various “worlds”
of capitalism have emphasized the capacity of coordinated market economies/social
democracies to effect greater equality of outcome due to more centralized and exten-
sive collective bargaining, and a stronger role for the state (Ebbinghaus and Manow
2001; van Rie et al. 2011). Meso-level factors linked to national varieties of capitalism
also play a role. At firm level, post-Keynesian theorists note that the latitude available
to firms to pursue profit over growth, and to exert control over working conditions, is
rooted in wider regulatory contexts (Stockhammer 2004, p. 723; Thompson 2013).
Considering this potential diversity, one important omission of the financialization
literature appears to be the uniformity with which it is applied to processes of long-
term global policy change.
Studies suggest that the European path to financialization may be distinct, due to
specific sets of drivers linked to European integration. From 1975 to 2005, many
European banks loosened their historical ties to industrial “patient capital”, increasing
exposure to high-yield market-based financial instruments (Ó Riain 2012). This merely
hastened deregulation in the interests of private capital, and the elimination of stability
mechanisms, such as currency devaluation (Ó Riain 2014, p. 116). This would prove a
crucial determinant of the incentive structure which permitted top earners to leverage
higher compensation, as well as a structural precursor to the erosion of workers’
bargaining power (Thompson 2013). Policy convergence thus played a key role in
Europe’s experience, curtailing national actors’ abilities to effect policy change
(Beckfield 2006, 2009; Becker and Jager 2010). In terms of post-crisis responses,
we also see evidence of substantial variation in responses between OECD members.
Greater post-bailout burden sharing between the public and private sectors has been
noted in certain countries (Grossman and Woll 2014), whilst others have suggested
that the institutions of the Eurozone amplified the causes of the crash, by enhancing
rather than mitigating competition between European “core and peripheral” countries
(Becker and Jager 2010; Bruff and Horn 2010).
Thelen (2012, 2014) is a strong critic of uniform liberalization narratives, and although
not addressing financialization specifically, her argument can be readily extended.
According to Thelen, experiences of liberalization vary more than the worlds of capitalism
literature suggests, where it is often theorized as a drift from coordinated to liberal market
structures, with attendant distributional consequences. Thelen challenges this view by
emphasizing how liberalization depends very much on the “coalitional foundations” on
which economic institutions rest. Her work complicates the encompassing narrative of
international liberalization, showing how it can occur through processes of deregulation,
dualization, or flexibilization (Thelen 2012, p. 8). This complexity is a welcome corrective
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to varieties of capitalism, but to speak of distributional consequences in this context is
often to speak of personal inequality (i.e. amongst labour) (Rueda and Pontusson 2000).
Furthermore, the underpinning “coalitional foundations” approach typically focuses on
the staples of economic sociology – labour markets, sectoral employment shares, and
industrial relations policy. As such, models like Thelen’s focus more on “labour in
general” rather than high net worth individuals who are often not immediately dependent
on labour markets, or earned income.
It also downplays the broader divide in economic rewards between capital and
labour, a key factor in finance-driven inequality. Therefore, whilst globalization is
interpreted in this framework as empowering mobile capital relative to nationally
anchored unions, financial capital is a distinct phenomenon. It empowers not only
capital-endowed incumbents via instruments not linked to direct production, but can
also dictate corporate strategy by incentivizing shareholder managerialism. The
financial sector itself also does not “behave” like others, with its high productivity
resulting from capital intensity and comparatively low employment. It is therefore
less certain how the sector is subject to influence from the “coalitional foundations”
which are principally dealt with in this literature in terms of their impact on
conventional economic sectors – services, retail, manufacturing. Finally, the sector
is less subject to typical national varieties of regulation. Financialization, as it has
worked through the European banking system, has weakened the significance of
national borders, as evidenced in the extent of inter-firm lending preceding the
financial crisis. This can render finance substantially independent of domestic reg-
ulation, weakening the applicability of liberalization narratives which still rely on
their fit with the characteristics of nations.
This perspective thus challenges uniform narratives which view liberalization (to which
we might add financialization) merely as a secular movement from a greater to lesser role
of the state in terms of capital, product, and labour market regulation. As such, it remains
to be explored whether the conditions typically associated with financialization inherently
give rise to greater inequality. As the foregoing section suggests, the variance across
countries is likely to be extensive, and variation in the extent of interest groups, degree of
corporatism, flexible labour market policies, wage bargaining coordination, and state
intervention in markets, are all likely to moderate inequality outcomes (Kenworthy
2010; Mahoney and Thelen 2009). Such is the objective of this paper – to explore the
various configurations of institutions associated with top income inequality and their
potential variation over different time periods, and to square these findings with the
wider theoretical literature on processes of financialization/liberalization. The following
section begins this task by detailing how the data structures most commonly used to
examine these processes have been handled in the political economy and policy
literatures.
3. Time Beyond the Methodological Divide: Panel vs Case-Based Methods
Pooling cross-sectional data over time is a common approach to the study of income
inequality from a political economy perspective (Kristal 2010; Kus 2012;
Stockhammer 2013; Flaherty 2015; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2015). They are espe-
cially useful for testing whether relations between variable sets are time-dependent,
what the nature of such time effects might be (short or long term for example), or
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whether significant historical events (structural breaks) play a role in driving variation
in the outcome. The preceding section has raised the question of uniformity in the
policy and institutional changes most commonly associated with financialization, and
how these may be linked to greater top income inequality. This is inherently a
question of cross-unit causal complexity, as our discussion has also set out some
tentative explanations for how cross-unit divergences may arise.
Can such complexity be captured by a regression-based approach alone, and are
regression and case-based approaches commensurable or substitutable? Byrne (1998)
and Thiem et al. (2016, p. 764) caution that “neither do saturated interaction models
integrate conjunctions . . . nor can conjunctions be conceptually mimicked by interac-
tions”. Although the wider literature is divided on their relative merits, Thiem et al.
are emphatic that both deal with fundamentally different causal logics – one formed of
multidimensional property spaces, the other of linear algebraic expressions. In short, it
is not enough for the analyst to justify choosing QCA due to difficulties in specifying
and interpreting higher-order interactions in a panel regression.
What are the specific advantages of a case-based approach to this project? One
difficulty of time-series approaches as practised in sociology (and panel regression in
particular) is an absence of consideration of the fit between empirical specifications of
dynamic models, and theories guiding model fit and interpretation. Some debate exists in
the political science literature (Keele and De Boef 2004; Keele and Kelly 2006; De Boef
and Keele 2008), which deals not only with technicalities of model specification, but with
the “assumptions they impose on the dynamics that govern how x and the errors impact y”
(Beck and Katz 2009, p. 7). For case-based analysts, this often manifests as a concern not
only to elaborate the “net impact” of individual causes, but to explore the causal condi-
tions under which outcomes occur (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 86; Vis 2012,
p. 169).
The causal logic of QCA is thus equifinal, where multiple combinations of causal
conditions can produce the same result (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Regression
is often seen as less capable of dealing with equifinality owing to the issues with
interpretation, collinearity, and degrees of freedom in higher-order interaction terms in
medium-N dataset (Vis 2012, p. 173; Thiem et al. 2016). QCA treats such causal
conditions (variables), in terms of their necessity or sufficiency to bring about an
outcome. This approach to causation is difficult in a panel context, as reporting does
not typically go beyond the net contribution of individual variables, without placing
excessive demands on model specification and assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann
2012, p. 87).
Does this acknowledgement help us advance the longitudinal study of inequality and
regulation? We know that the institutional structures of states, and their orientations to
redistribution, play a critical role in determining levels of inequality. These causal
channels are not uniform, and they abound with contradictions. How, for example, can
a state such as Denmark sustain high levels of financial sector productivity whilst
maintaining strong redistribution and low inequality? Are retrenchment, deunioniza-
tion, and deregulation necessary preconditions of top income growth? This scope for
causal complexity operates not only in cross-section, but over time, yet the causal
logic of configurational methods is fundamentally different. A longitudinal QCA thus
allows us to explore both the empirical structure of policy regimes in different epochs,
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and to assess the causal necessity of the various institutional conditions ad
combinations.
4. Data and Method
4.1. Rationale for Repeated Moving Average Cross-Section Design
The study data comprises a set of three-year moving averages derived from a larger panel
dataset of OECD countries running from 1975 to 2005. Owing both to the volatility of
certain key measures, and the difficulty of faithfully representing the longitudinal structure
of the data at discrete time points, I opted for a set of repeated cross-sections comprised of
moving averages, incorporating phases from the beginning, mid-point, and end of the
available data (1) 1975–1977, (2) 1989–1991, and (3) 2003–2005. Calibrating measures at
each time point accounts for structural breaks and trends in the time series. Although some
authors attempt to incorporate longitudinal design into QCA, they arguably do not over-
come the core issue of representing the changing configurations of cases, their mobility
within and between causal conditions and set memberships, and their location within the
overall property space relative to other cases at given points in time (Hino 2009). Fixed-
effects QCA attempts to address this by setting case-specific calibration criteria using all
data points from within an individual case (country) over time for each causal condition
(variable). In doing so, it focuses more clearly on variations within units over time, but
discards variation between units. As such, the variation within each case is treated as a
unique instance relative to others. As our interest is to tease out the causal factors which
mitigate rising income concentration, however, retaining information on how cases are
located relative to each other is central.
The defining rationale for a configurational approach is its theoretical fit with the data-
generating process – the presence of a defined theory of longitudinal variation, and a
causal narrative linking policies and institutions (regulation, finance, and collective power
resources) to outcomes (inequality). As such, it is the empirical structure of these epochs,
as derived from the cases themselves, which is of primary interest – what conjunctions of
condition are observed within time periods, and how they change. This is a fundamental
departure from the logic of panel regression analysis which views significant historical
epochs as conditions to be controlled through, for example, structural breaks or trend
dummies, or the purging of unit heterogeneity through fixed effects. The causal logic of
such an approach through regression is unifinal, and based on interaction with additive
partial effects, rather than conjunction (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 86; Thiem
et al. 2016).
4.2. Data and Measurements
The share of total income accruing to the top 1 per cent is our outcome variable.
Considering the qualitatively specific and historically variable pathways to top income
growth suggested above, the top incomes variable captures a unique aspect of inequality
under finance-driven capitalism. The World Wealth and Inequality Database combines
taxation-based income estimates with standardized gross income and population totals,
enhancing cross-national comparability (Atkinson and Piketty 2007; Atkinson et al.
2010). The time coverage of the data is limited by the availability of suitable measures
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of financial regulation and financialization. The most complete set of measures capturing
individual components of financial regulation is that of Abiad et al. (2008) which runs
until 2005. This set contains information on specific regulatory measures such as the
extent of banking sector supervision, sectoral entry barriers, and financial controls.
Based on the foregoing review of literature, the classic causal combination, or set of
variables which defines the property space of finance-driven inequality, consists of
measures of government consumption as a share of GDP from Penn World Table
(Heston et al. 2012), union density (Visser 2013), financial globalization measured as
the share of external assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP, and Abiad et al.’s
(2008) financial reform index, with greater scores indicating greater extents of banking
sector liberalization. Government consumption and union density are key measures of
distributive capacity amongst labour and government, and consistently feature in studies
of top income shares (Kus 2012; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Stockhammer 2013; Flaherty
2015). Our financialization variables are of direct relevance to regulation, and hence,
national or trans-national policy. Abiad’s is an index which takes account of such policy
variation in its construction – for example, whether a country has adopted Basle capital
adequacy standards (international), or ease of foreign entry to domestic markets (national).
Financial globalization was observed as an especially strong predictor of inequality
(Flaherty 2015), and in turn captures the relative empowerment of mobile capital under
financial deregulation, as well as the diversification of within-firm income streams and,
especially, pre-crisis exposure of national economies to volatile financial markets.
The final dataset captures a mix of liberal, corporatist, Antipodean, and social-demo-
cratic welfare states, liberal, coordinated market, and Asian economies. Nine missing data
points (Korean income, 1989–1991, Spanish income, 1975–1977; Portuguese unioniza-
tion, 1975–1977) were imputed with a third-order polynomial. Financial globalization
(finglob) was logged prior to calibration, but for ease of interpretation, the original
measure is reported in all tables. All subsequent output was derived using the transformed
version. Appendix Table A1 provides summary statistics by country, and for the outcome
variable (top1), the coefficient of a trend dummy in a linear panel regression is provided
(top1 change) This gives an indication of the direction of change across the pool of cases.
Full details regarding labels, measures, and sources are provided in Table 1, which also
summarizes the theoretical relevance of the individual measures as parameters of the
property space.
A note of caution is required on the method of calibration used in this paper.
Calibration by establishing relevant anchor points for various degrees of set membership
is an inherent benefit of fsQCA. To justify calibration, the theoretical relevance of the
anchor points must typically be argued. This study uses statistical rather than theoretical
criteria, and direct calibration to calibrate set membership, a technique often at odds with
the wider case-based literature. The data in this study are limited by several factors –
suitable financialization data to use as policy indicators, the time coverage of such data,
and, primarily, the availability of top 1 per cent income data from the World Wealth and
Inequality Database. Sets in this study were formed by direct calibration. This involved
centring variables, adopting minimum and maximum scores as anchors for non-member-
ship and full membership, and 0 as the point of maximum ambiguity. The procedure was
repeated for all three waves, yielding unique calibration for each, within each time frame.
Table 2 below lists set membership scores for each case on each condition.
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Given the method of calibration used, some justification is required. Pennings (2005, p. 325)
suggests in his study that, when dealing with a full set of OECD cases, the data be viewed as
constituting a population in the absence of external reference points (2005, p. 325). These
criteria are not met by this study, owing to availability issues above, but this should not limit the
utility of its findings. First, the conceptual coherence of the OECD is arbitrary relative to more
defined conceptual schemes (such as worlds of welfare capitalism for example, where specific
measures constitute criteria for inclusion. One could argue that the dataset in this study
comprises a representative mix of cases – high and low inequality, more and less financialized,
representatives from key worlds of capitalism – although it is insufficient to establish a
conceptual basis for “population”. The key issue with direct calibration is that movement of
cases in and out of the dataset will alter the original membership scores. However, any anchor
point set for the various financemeasures in this data would be purely arbitrary ‒ especially so in
the case of financialization data which is very much an active area of research.
As this is an exploratory study, I pay attention to the location of cases within the property
space, relative to each other, whilst bearing in mind that the addition of cases may alter scores
using these calibration criteria, since the method is data-dependent (Verkuilen 2005). Any
arguments to causal necessity and sufficiency should be taken as tentative, and subject to
modification if more cases become available. The full data are provided as Appendix Table A2
for replication and reinterpretation – and I proceed on the assumption that direct calibration from
standardization, and full publication of the original data, is the most objective means of over-
coming this issue. As noted above, there is an insufficient basis for establishing this pool of cases
as a population, and as such, any causal inference should be limited to the pool of cases used in
this paper.
5. Results
In the notation of sets, we use ~ to denote the absence of a condition. The classic causal
combination as derived from the literature above can now be stated as: low levels of
government consumption, low levels of unionization, high levels of financial deregula-
tion, and high levels of financial globalization. In fuzzy logic, the interpretation of
“absence” of a condition is not zero, but as “more out of” the set of cases scoring high
on the condition in question. The resulting ideal-type causal combination is thus:1
~con * ~union * finref * finglo
Membership scores were assigned to each case following the procedure laid out by
Ragin (2008), by which a case’s degree of membership in a causal combination is given
by the lowest value of the conditions used (in this case, the lowest score on the sets ~con *
~union * finref * finglo). Working from this “classic” causal combination, it is possible to
assess its causal sufficiency by plotting its combination membership scores against
membership scores of the outcome. Causal sufficiency for a given combination is
indicated when scores on the outcome are higher than the cause on a bivariate plot of
both score sets (i.e. in an ideal case of sufficiency, when membership of the combination
is high, so too are its scores on inequality). We can use this approach to begin exploring
the fit between these regression-derived conditions in a case-based context. The following
discussion focuses not only on the reduced solutions (more of which to follow), but
especially on the scores assigned to individual cases on each condition, as provided in
Table 2.
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Taking the most recent wave of data (2003–2005), Figure 2 shows a Nordic cluster of “low
combination * low inequality” toward the origin, and a less coherent cluster of Anglo-Saxon
nations toward the top-left quadrant. The US, UK, Canada, and Norway reflect both high
degrees of top income inequality, and highly deregulated financial markets. Comparatively low
levels of financial globalization in theUS places theUS low in its membership, but together they
demonstrate generally high levels of financial deregulation (finref), coupled with lower degrees
of unionization (~union) and government consumption (~con). Norway gives an early indica-
tion of divergent causal pathways, by combining high degrees of unionization with both low
regulation, and high inequality, as an exception amongst the Ghent countries (Ebbinghaus and
Manow 2001). Compared to a liberal exemplary such as the US, this suggests that financial
deregulation is by itself insufficient for high inequality.
As stated above, a case is deemed consistent if its score on the causal combination is greater
than its score on the outcome. Intuitively, when attempting to assess the utility of a causal
combination, cases where membership is high but their score on the outcome is low (i.e. below
the diagonal) are deemed inconsistent. France, Spain, but especially Switzerland, contradict the
causal pattern by strongly fitting the causal criteria but showing lower membership of the
inequality set (by the causal logic of the classic combination, we should expect high degrees of
membership on these cases). Those cases demonstrating membership of the outcome greater
than their score on combinationmembership thus contradict the argument for causal necessity as
their presence on the outcome is independent of their conformity to the causal mix (Schneider
and Wagemann 2012, p. 75).
This suggestion may be formalized by measuring the consistency of the results. In Figure 2,
for example, we assign these cases the outcome score instead, and divide this new figure by the
total of original membership scores in the set. An ideal solution with perfect consistency (i.e. no
Figure 2. Classic combination membership and outcome score consistency, 03–05
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deviant cases) would score closer to 1. Coverage is obtained by summing the consistent (non-
deviant) membership scores, and dividing by the sum of outcome membership. The distinction
between coverage and consistency is important, as although the causal combination may score
high on consistency, the proportion of cases conforming to the causal path may be low, reducing
the weight of evidence for the combination as causally sufficient – in which case further
exploration of causal combinations case by case may be warranted. The solution measures
consistent at 0.913, but its coverage scores 0.460. This solution thus may not be sufficient alone
to account for the causal paths to inequality.
The picture is complicated when we consider the placement of cases on the plot, where no
cases record both membership of the outcome and conjunction. This suggests that for the most
recent data period, the classic combination does a poor job of explaining top income inequality.
This pattern holds for 1975–1977 and 1989–1991, where only Switzerland fits the causal
argument (see Appendix Figures A1 and A2 for these graphs). Despite the evident insufficiency
of the classic causal argument alone, its absence is important, and to be explained –why, despite
the weight of evidence in the literature, is this pathway not observed empirically?
5.1. Causal Complexity Over Time – Causal Pathways to Finance-Driven Inequality
We may explore this further by examining summaries of the classic solution over the three
waves of data. Consistency and coverage scores across waves (see Appendix Table A3) suggest
that (1) the conformity of the “classic” causal conditions of inequality becomes more general-
ized across cases over time, but (2) in light of the stable consistency and modest coverage, the
potential remains for greater causal complexity than indicated by the classic combination of
~con * ~union * finref * finglo. The table of fuzzy-set scores provides little evidence for causal
necessity amongst any of the causal conditions. Utilizing the subset principle of fuzzy-set
analysis, there are no instances across any of the conditions over all three waves where single
conditions are necessary to produce high inequality (i.e. there are no instances in which the
outcome is a clear subset of the individual causal conditions). Consistent with previous work on
welfare state expenditure, this is largely to be expected as it is unlikely that any single factor is
necessarily connected to high inequality (Pennings 2005, p. 326). The increase in coverage
scores on the classic solution may indicate modest increase in its generalizability over time.
From this basic preliminary analysis, we can begin to deconstruct causal complexity in
greater detail, by exploring the presence of additional causal combinations in different eras by
means of a truth table, and by subsequently considering the relative locations of cases in the
various combinations. Table 3 presents an assessment of causal diversity beyond the combina-
tion assessed thus far. It condenses the results of three truth tables (see Appendix Tables A3 and
A4), one for each wave of data, into a set of empirically relevant causal combinations derived
from the data. As such, each tabulated causal combination exhibits a consistency and coverage
score, and a complex solution (discussed below). Whilst these do not represent all possible
observed causal combinations, they constitute the most consistent, based on the standard
procedure of discarding those combinations with low empirical occurrence as remainders.
The truth table was constructed using a cut-off number of two (those combinations with one
or less occurrence), and a consistency threshold of 0.80, above which causal combinations
returned in the truth table were retained for further analysis. The decision to choose a cut-off
point is important, as it involves making an explicit claim that causal solutions evident on only
one case are “too unique”. Whilst this is often a difficult decision to justify in the context of a
panel design, it is necessary to achieve a suitable balance between reductionism and complexity.
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These results are simplified further using the complex solution procedure (Ragin 2008, p.
174). This process utilizes the results of the truth table to reduce the set of observed causal
combinations into simpler solutions. This is achieved by removing those conditions which are
present on all combinations (and therefore irrelevant as independent causal conditions, as they
are necessary to observing the outcome). The complex solution is here preferred as it requires no
assumptions on the behaviours of conditions to be entered by the user – simplifying instead from
all empirical observations in the dataset. Following the procedure adopted above, plots of
membership scores on the complex solution (X) against the outcome (Y) are provided to test the
relative consistency of the alternative combination as a causal path to high inequality (see
Figures 3, 4, and 5).
Of note is the continuing presence of ~union in the solutions for all three waves, suggesting a
power resources argument may be central to accounting for top income growth. Its role appears
less ambiguous than that of the other conditions, and its timing coincides with the classic
“structural break” of the post-oil crisis era in collective labour, where workers’ shares of
productivity began to decline, assisted by technology-driven skill premiums, and state/corporate
antagonism toward the labour movement (ILO 2013). The effect of deunionization is that top
income growth accelerated as wage equalization declined under weakening unions, and where
bargaining power in new technology-based sectors resided not in collective solidarity, but with
the capacity to leverage scarce technical skills for greater returns.
In short, as service and knowledge-work overtook industrial employment, bargaining
power became “individualized”. Such is the problematic skill-biased technological
change argument (Atkinson 2009), but it reflects deeper structural shifts in compensa-
tion and pay dynamics. Piketty remarked on the impact of reduced top income taxation
as a measure which opened space for top earners to bargain for greater pay without the
risk of losing gains to the exchequer. The issuing of stocks as components of com-
pensation, and the shifting of the tax away from the top, are themselves policies which
are part of the process of financialization – tying top incomes to the market perfor-
mance of firms, and eroding regulations designed to keep such systems in check
(Thompson 2013). In generalizing these findings, however, some cautions are war-
ranted. First, the issue of sample selectivity as discussed above must be kept in mind,
as the calibration (and hence solutions) are data-dependent. Second, limited diversity is
evident in the solutions presented in the truth tables (see Appendix Table A4), where
Table 3. Causal solutions from fuzzy-set truth table analysis (number >1, consistency > 0.79)
1975–1977 1989–1991 2003–2005
Causal combinations with
highest consistency scores
con * ~union * finref
* ~finglo
~con * ~union *
~finref * ~finglo
~con * ~union *
~finref * ~finglo
con * ~union *
finref * finglo
~con * ~union *
finref * ~finglo
~con * ~union *
~finref * ~finglo
Consistency score 0.923, 0.840 0.819, 0.808 0.891, 0.889
Complex solution con*
~union*
finref*
~finglo*
~con*
~union*
~finref*
~finglo
~con*
~union*
~finglo*
Complex solution consistency 0.923 0.820 0.854
Complex solution coverage 0.425 0.519 0.622
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Figure 3. Complex solution membership and outcome score consistency (1975–1977)
Figure 4. Complex solution membership and outcome score consistency (1989–1991)
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no empirical instances of several possible combinations are observed. The solution
plots (Figures 3–5) also show few empirical instances of the conjunction and outcome
(particularly so in 1975–1977). As such, we conclude by considering diversity across
key cases, in an attempt to balance this dual goal of parsimony via the solution, and
complexity via the cases (Ragin 2008, pp. 148–149).
5.2. Diversity Across Cases
Returning to the level of cases and configurations, we find that in the 1970s, deregulation and
deunionization appear prominent conditions of top income growth, but by the 1990s and 2000s,
regulation and financial globalization become irrelevant. Low consumption became central to
the causal path in 1989‒1991, consistent with a general shift amongst capitalist democracies in
the sample from supply- to demand-facing models of investment and public funding. Denmark
records the only decline of the sample of cases included in this study – reflecting its resilience to
other forms of inequality such as its stable rate of change in labour’s share of national product
(Flaherty and Ó Riain 2015). This despite its higher rate of financial sector productivity draws
attention to the causal factors underpinning its seemingly higher capacity for redistribution. The
case presents an interesting contradiction –Denmark records a productivity rate (per capita gross
values added) in its financial sector which outstripped that of manufacturing ‒ and indeed all
other economic sectors – throughout most of the 2000s, surpassing that of Ireland which is
typically held as a model of finance-based economic growth (Ó Riain 2012, 2014; Flaherty and
Ó Riain 2013, p. 66).
In the financialization “exemplar” of theUS, 41 per cent of the world’s millionaires are found,
and high levels of shareholding and debt set it almost eight times greater than its nearest
Figure 5. Complex solution membership and outcome score consistency (2003–2005)
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contender (China) in terms of ultra-high-net-worth individuals (Credit Suisse 2014, p. 46). The
contrast of causal paths bears closer inspection: both retain respective membership/non-mem-
bership of their outcome sets, but whilst Denmark enters the set of reformed countries in its
second wave, it retains its membership of unionized nations – and stronger financial globaliza-
tion. As such, it contradicts the “either/or” logic ‒ and the dominant narrative of neoliberal
institutionalism ‒ as financialization is neither predicated on an erosion of collective power
resources, nor predictive of high inequality following from deregulation and financial
globalization.
There are also contradictory cases in the causal mix where financial globalization is impli-
cated – it remains consistently relevant to the UK, which joins the set of high-inequality
countries in 1989–1991, yet is absent in the US. Conversely, Switzerland exits the set of high
inequality nations in 2003–2005, despite remaining in the set of financially globalized nations.
Financial globalization thus appears irrelevant to the passage of a country to high inequality. The
UK‒US comparison is perhaps most illuminating in terms of the proximate “causes” of the
financial crisis, with outward-looking inter-agency investment playing the greater role in the
UK, relative to the endogenous inter-agency securitization lending practices in the US financial
system. Both pathways, inevitably, lead to similar avenues for top income accumulation.
Finland reinforces the ambiguity of regulation in the “classic model”, with low levels of reform,
yet similar non-membership of the high-inequality set.
How might we account for the irrelevance of regulation in the causal mix for
2003–2005 (the complex solution)? Furthermore, what accounts for its presence in
1975–1977? The comparative capitalisms literature often distinguishes between “patient”
and “financial” capital channels as the basis for capital accumulation. The standard
argument would suggest that under tightly regulated capital markets, and with a notional
separation of commercial and investment banking, that “patient” capital constituted a
necessary condition of top-income-set membership in the 1970s. As deregulation con-
tinued apace during the 1980s and 1990s, deregulation becomes ever more central to the
causal mix driving top-income-set-membership – before becoming irrelevant in the
immediate pre-crisis era. This is consistent with panel evidence from the immediate crisis
era which shows a smaller impact for regulation on top incomes (Flaherty 2015).
6. Conclusion
Is financialization therefore a sufficient condition of high inequality? Evidence from the analysis
is weak, even if we adopt a high threshold of ambiguity.2 The generalizability of the classic
causal combination has precedent in the wider inequality literature, especially in work on
Europe where common policy frameworks ‒ EMU for example, or Basel compliance
(Guttman 2008) ‒ may have accelerated processes of retrenchment (Beckfield 2006, 2009).
The literature on labour’s share also identifies institutional convergence, in the form of product
and labour market deregulation, as a key inequality stressor – although the “contagion mechan-
ism” is more nebulous than centralized European monetary policy, instead often attributed to a
general decline in the collective power of labour worldwide. Why, therefore, does this argument
appear not to hold when examined across cases? It is possible thatmanifest regulation may play
the lesser role, and this is certainly plausible when considering the development of “shadow”
banking sectors in countries such as Ireland (in developer-led property lending) and the US
(with subprime mortgage markets). Their role in driving top incomes is well established, and
potentially independent of formal regulation.
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The consistent solutions derived above appear less compatible with the evidence – as seen
from the positioning of ambiguous cases to the lower half of the scatterplots in Figures 3–5, and
the absence of any empirical instances of both classic combination membership, and high
inequality (Switzerland aside). This may indicate a fragmentation of the factors of finance-
driven inequality, whereby context becomes the greater determinant of whether a country
experiences high inequality as a result. Similarly, the solution convergence and coverage
score may reflect a gradual erosion of the applicability of the classic model. Overall, the
evidence revealed by this exercise suggests the unifinal narrative of finance-driven inequality
is more fragmented than regression-based analyses may suggest. Notwithstanding the evidence
furnished by panel studies, mechanisms must be theorized through the lens of cases, as stressors
are ultimately filtered through national contexts. These findings potentially add empirical clarity
to macro-models of inequality such as that of Piketty’s (2014) model which emphasizes an
“excess of capital returns over base economic growth” as a mechanism for rising top inequality.
If such models can be accused of suffering from an under-appreciation of context, strategizing
for redistribution can be assisted by exercises such as this. Even those frameworks which
attempt to ground financialization’s mechanisms at the level of the firm and workplace
(Thompson 2013) tend to reproduce narratives of neoliberal institutionalism, which emphasize
either the Anglo-Saxon, or liberal market experience. Our results thus contradict this dominant
narrative, in line with Thelen’s critique of decontextualized liberalization processes (2014).
What of the political project of redistribution? The presence of ~con and ~union in the various
solutions is important here. Whilst a case-by-case analysis shows departures from the classic
formula of inequality under financialization, a consistent role for institutional resources linked to
redistribution (government spending and unionization) is found. Whilst the Anglo-Saxon
literature asserts the relevance of a power resources argument, the reality of implementation is
more complex. Whilst the regression-based literature is emphatic on the net effect of finance-
based stressors of equality, the possibility of reverse-engineering policy solutions based on panel
evidence alone is clearly short-sighted. Whilst proposed measures such as financial transaction
taxes would go some way toward mitigating the tendencies of financialization toward greater
top income growth, the causal pathways to high inequality are not necessarily uniform. Whilst
power resources appear central to the mix of conditions which could – taking a probabilistic
interpretation of our findings – offset top income growth, they interact in different ways with
different conditions to produce divergent outcomes. The question is whether the sacrificing of
parsimony inherent in a QCA approach is of benefit to processes of policy strategizing which
typically lean on macro-level arguments about the effects of different variables.
Whereas authors such as Jayadev (2007) and Stockhammer (2013) assert both the
damaging effects of deregulation on the distribution of income (factor and personal), as
well as the greater effect of financialization relative to other stressors such as globalization
and technology, the evidence here reinforces the centrality of workers and public power
resources to potential redistribution. Although we have a sound empirical basis for
establishing a common experience of financialization across advanced capitalist democ-
racies, conventional forms of social protection still matter. The continuing relevance of
institutional diversity is reminiscent of Boyer’s configurational exercise, which noted
underlying diversity in domestic growth capacity between social democracies and deregu-
lated market economies (Boyer 2004). Deferring to SSA theory, its key conceptual point
is that assuming the existence of basic systemic-wide properties ‒ such as a fundamental
antagonism between capital and labour, or the centrality of inequality to capitalism ‒ need
not lapse into crude structuralism (Jessop 2001, 2013). There is a clear pathway to agency
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and diversity in this general narrative which resonates with Polanyi’s concept of the
“double movement”, where systemic contradictions open space for a variety of possible
pathways to inequality depending on national contexts (Dale 2010). In short, as Polanyi
emphasized the variety of possible social compacts emerging from fundamental social
tensions, so too should we expect to find variation in the contexts and drivers of inequality
as financialization enacts its structural changes in diverse ways – to the benefit of some,
and detriment of others.
Notes
1. Scores for ~con and ~union are thus derived using the negation rule, where degree of “non-membership” (i.e.
degree of membership in the non-unionized set), is given by: ~ = 1-[set membership score].
2. The results of this exercise run contrary to expectations, particularly in context of the wider financialization
and comparative inequality literatures. The negative results are surprising, but the presence of diversity in the
various configurations of membership scores is not (see Roberts and Kwon 2017 for a discussion of varieties
of capitalism and finance-driven inequality). Alternative calibration strategies could be explored in future
work, but there is currently little consensus in the literature, or intuitive anchors in the various distributions,
from which to construct meaningful membership thresholds.
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Table A1. Summary statistics, 1975–2005 by country (mean with SD in parentheses)
Country top1 top1 change consump union finref finglob
Australia 6.64 0.167 7.89 37.77 0.65 106.37
(1.64) (0.94) (10.20) (0.36) (61.96)
Canada 9.70 0.193 7.27 33.60 0.85 154.90
(1.89) (0.64) (2.06) (0.14) (62.56)
Denmark 5.45 −0.016 7.66 75.9 0.74 183.45
(.43) (0.92) (2.75) (0.26) (101.80)
Finland 5.93 0.162 7.56 72.80 0.64 153.51
(1.94) (0.54) (4.67) (0.20) (123.47)
France 7.90 0.026 7.45 12.43 0.71 182.41
(0.48) (0.40) (4.89) (0.30) (108.93)
Germany 10.31 0.038 7.26 30.81 0.82 142.63
(0.80) (1.44) (4.83) (0.08) (92.20)
Ireland 7.76 0.168 7.30 53.84 0.81 577.75
(1.71) (1.94) (9.30) (0.20) (591.20)
Italy 7.75 0.102 6.47 40.87 0.60 104.72
(1.02) (0.31) (5.78) (0.26) (67.60)
Japan 7.58 0.064 5.84 26.33 0.64 78.34
(0.73) (0.54) (4.60) (0.20) (39.79)
Korea 7.86 0.071 6.42 13.76 0.52 62.92
(1.01) (1.48) (2.43) (0.21) (21.86)
Netherland 5.82 0.015 10.24 27.54 0.87 326.26
(0.51) (0.67) (5.43) (0.11) (216.51)
New Zealand 7.50 0.153 8.46 43.38 0.73 128.40
(1.92) (1.25) (18.31) (0.29) (63.03)
Norway 6.59 0.247 7.53 56.21 0.66 143.49
(2.85) (0.70) (1.76) (0.22) (78.88)
Portugal 7.62 0.164 4.02 33.94 0.50 150.49
(1.79) (0.60) (13.20) (0.31) (111.91)
Spain 8.16 0.036 6.47 16.26 0.73 107.91
(0.38) (0.58) (8.34) (0.24) (79.85)
Sweden 4.97 0.064 8.46 80.62 0.74 171.78
(0.74) (0.80) (3.75) (0.27) (121.46)
Switzerland 9.10 0.046 4.81 24.79 0.88 490.87
(0.64) (0.26) (4.36) (0.05) (251.74)
United Kingdom 9.64 0.311 8.69 39.98 0.86 389.00
(2.87) (1.45) (8.36) (0.18) (166.44)
United States 11.95 0.343 8.15 16.65 0.86 89.08
(3.23) (1.35) (3.69) (0.12) (44.86)
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Table A4. Truth tables (n ≥ 2, consistency ≥ 0.8)
negcon negunion finref finglob number top1 consistency
1975–1977
0 1 1 0 2 1 0.923
1 1 0 0 2 1 0.840
0 1 1 1 2 0 0.783
1 0 0 0 3 0 0.652
0 0 1 1 2 0 0.621
0 0 0 0 4 0 0.536
1989–1991
1 1 0 0 4 1 0.819
0 1 1 1 2 1 0.808
1 0 1 1 2 0 0.661
0 0 1 1 3 0 0.656
0 0 0 0 2 0 0.645
2003–2005
1 1 1 0 2 1 0.891
1 1 0 0 2 1 0.889
0 1 1 0 3 1 0.837
0 1 1 1 3 0 0.769
0 0 1 1 2 0 0.708
Note: The consistency column corresponds to the figures reported in the raw consist. column in
fsQCA.
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Figure A2. Classic combination sufficiency (1989–1991).
Figure A1. Classic combination sufficiency (1975–1977).
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